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Interpreting Initiatives 
Michael D. Gilbert†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
In 2011, in the shadow of an explosive referendum on col-
lective bargaining rights,1 voters in Ohio quietly confronted Is-
sue 3.2 Drafted by conservative groups and propelled to the bal-
lot by 546,000 signatures,3 the measure would amend the state 
constitution to read: “[N]o law or rule shall compel . . . any per-
son, employer, or health care provider to participate in a health 
care system.”4 The measure sought to undermine the “individu-
al mandate,” a provision of the federal Affordable Care Act 
(ACA)5 requiring Americans to purchase health insurance.6
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. This paper 
was written for a symposium entitled A More Perfect Union? Democracy in the 
Age of Ballot Initiatives held at the University of Minnesota School of Law on 
October 26, 2012. For helpful input I thank attendees of that symposium and 
Ben Doherty, Ethan Leib, Caleb Nelson, Dan Ortiz, Richard Schragger, Glen 
Staszewski, and Ferras Vinh. Copyright © 2013 by Michael D. Gilbert.  
 The 
 1. See Rachel Weiner, Issue 2 Falls, Ohio Collective Bargaining Law Re-
pealed, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/the-fix/post/issue-2-falls-ohio-collective-bargaining-law-repealed/2011/11/ 
08/gIQAyZ0U3M_blog.html.  
 2. See Catherine Candisky, Health-Care Mandate Liberty or Lawsuit 
‘Orgy’? Issue 3 Debaters Differ, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2011, at 1A 
(“With less than two weeks until Election Day, Issue 3 has gotten scant atten-
tion and neither side apparently has funding for television advertising.”).  
 3. Jim Provance, Obama Health Care Opponents File Petitions in Co-
lumbus, TOLEDO BLADE, July 6, 2011, http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2011/ 
07/06/Obama-healthcare-opponents-file-petitions-in-Columbus.html.  
 4. OHIO SEC. OF STATE, ISSUE 3: PROPOSED BALLOT INITIATIVE (2009), 
available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/ballotboard/2011/3 
-language.pdf 
 5. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2011). 
 6. See Andy Kroll, The Ohio Tea Party’s Big “Obamacare” Fail, MOTHER 
JONES (Nov. 3, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/ 
ohio-issue-3-obamacare-tea-party (“An early pamphlet created by the Ohio 
Project, the grassroots group created to promote the amendment, focuses en-
tirely on defusing ‘the new federal health care measure passed by Congress.”). 
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proponents of Issue 3 extolled voters to “[p]rotect your health 
care freedom . . . and keep government out of your personal 
medical decisions.”7 Ohioans approved the measure by a wide 
margin, with 66% voting in favor.8
Issue 3 cannot achieve its intended purpose because the 
Supremacy Clause stipulates that federal laws like the ACA 
trump state law.
  
9 By the time of the election, even supporters of 
the measure conceded that.10 But at the state level it still has 
teeth. In addition to forbidding compulsory participation in a 
(state) health care system, Issue 3 forbade laws prohibiting 
“the purchase or sale of health care,” defined the term “health 
care system,” and added other provisions to the constitution.11 
That language begs many questions. Does Issue 3 render inva-
lid the state’s ban on late term abortions? That ban, the argu-
ment goes, unlawfully prohibits “the purchase or sale of health 
care.”12 Does Issue 3 affect state policies on workers compensa-
tion, child support, school immunizations, college coverage, and 
disease tracking?13 All of those programs compel some actors to 
purchase health care or otherwise participate in the health care 
system.14 The list of questions goes on. As one critic put it, Issue 
3 “will breed an orgy of lawsuits.”15
Issue 3 is not unique, nor are the interpretive challenges it 
raises. Voters in dozens of states routinely use initiatives, some 
constitutional and some statutory, to address important issues 
ranging from taxes to abortion and eminent domain.
 
16
 
 7. OHIO SEC. OF STATE, VOTE YES ON ISSUE 3 (2011), available at http:// 
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/ballotboard/2011/3-argument-for.pdf. 
 The task 
 8. Weiner, supra note 1.  
 9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 10. See Candisky, supra note 2 (“In the first public debate on Issue 3, both 
sides agreed that the proposed constitutional amendment would not exempt 
Ohioans from a requirement in the new federal health-care law that most 
Americans buy health insurance . . . .”).  
 11. See OHIO SEC. OF STATE, supra note 4. 
 12. See Press Release, Innovation Ohio, IO Report: Why Conservatives 
Should Oppose Issue 3 (Oct. 26, 2011), http://innovationohio.org/press/io-report 
-why-conservatives-should-oppose-issue-3.  
 13. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN ET AL., INNOVATION OHIO, BAD MEDICINE: 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF OHIO’S ISSUE 3, at 3–4 (Sept. 1, 2011), http:// 
69.195.124.74/~innovby5/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/IOReport_ 
BadMedicine_0901.pdf; see also Kroll, supra note 6 (discussing potential unin-
tended consequences).  
 14. See MEHLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 3. 
 15. See Candisky, supra note 2.  
 16. These examples come from 2011 alone. See Election 2011 Preview, 
BALLOTWATCH (Initiative & Referendum Inst., L.A., Cal.), Oct. 2011, http:// 
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of interpreting them routinely falls on courts.17
This Article takes on the twin questions of how do, and 
how should, courts interpret initiatives? With respect to the 
first, judges almost universally claim that they seek “voter in-
tent.”
 That interpre-
tive function is especially fraught in the context of direct de-
mocracy. Many initiatives are poorly drafted, and many judges 
are subject to reelection by the same voters who approved the 
initiatives.  
18 Scholars reject this approach on the ground that such 
intent does not exist or cannot be ascertained.19 In other words, 
judges are not doing—indeed, cannot do—what they say. But I 
suggest otherwise. We can understand the search for voter in-
tent to be a search for the preferences of the median voter. That 
concept is concrete. Those preferences, though difficult to ascer-
tain, did exist when the initiative passed.20
With respect to the second question, I develop the case for 
why judges should interpret initiatives consistent with the 
preferences of the median voter. Direct democracy is an explic-
itly majoritarian institution.
 This analysis clari-
fies the inquiry by uncovering an objective target for judges in 
these cases. It also may have explanatory power. Judges sub-
ject to reelection or reappointment have some incentive to con-
sider the interpretation today’s median voter would favor, and 
today’s median may resemble the enacting median.  
21 In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt pro-
claimed that the power of initiative and referendum would help 
ensure “the majority of the people do in fact, as well as theory, 
rule.”22 It makes sense then, one might reason, to identify the 
plausible interpretations of an initiative and ask which one a 
majority of voters would have preferred. Under reasonable as-
sumptions, a majority would have preferred the median voter’s 
favorite interpretation to all others.23
 
www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202011-1%20Preview.pdf.  
 That interpretation has 
an especially strong claim to being majoritarian and, therefore, 
is consistent with the purpose of direct democracy. 
 17. See infra Part I (discussing how judges do and should interpret initia-
tives). 
 18. See infra Part I.A.  
 19. See infra Part I.  
 20. They existed under certain assumptions anyway. See infra Part II.  
 21. See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 22. 17 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The Right of the People to Rule, in THE 
WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 151, 152 (Hermann Hagedorn ed., 1926). 
 23. See infra Part II. 
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I am not the first to suggest that judges focus on the medi-
an. Many scholars have argued that courts interpreting stat-
utes do—or should—consider the preferences of the median leg-
islator or of median committee members.24
To be clear, I do not argue that majoritarianism is “best” or 
socially optimal. Nor do I endorse direct democracy. I do not 
even “endorse” majoritarian interpretations. I am not advocat-
ing for a policy proposal but rather exploring ideas. I am trying 
to separate questions about the meaning of particular initia-
tives from normative judgments about the use of initiatives in 
general. If we focus just on meaning, and if we accept direct 
democracy’s majoritarian purpose, then we can develop a case 
for attending to the preferences of the median voter.  
 But the argument is 
much stronger where initiatives are concerned. Focusing on the 
median does not further the purpose of legislatures, but it does 
further the purpose of direct democracy.  
The analysis leads to some surprising conclusions. If judges 
confront an ambiguity in an initiative, and if they seek the ma-
joritarian interpretation, then they should consider the views of 
all voters, including those who opposed the initiative.25
The paper concludes by connecting the question of inter-
pretation to the question of constitutional review. Some promi-
nent scholars fear that initiatives violate federal and state con-
stitutions more often than ordinary legislation. Unchecked 
majorities, they worry, will stamp on the rights of minorities. 
They have responded by calling for a more searching judicial 
review of initiatives. Facilitating that kind of review probably 
would require greater judicial independence; judges subject to 
reelection or reappointment probably will not strike down pop-
ular initiatives on the constitutional margin. But greater inde-
pendence implies less accountability, which in turn implies a 
 Courts 
probably should not adopt the interpretation favored by an ini-
tiative’s drafters, even though they know the initiative best. 
Opinion polls might be helpful when interpreting initiatives. 
Lastly, we should not necessarily condemn judges for interpret-
ing initiatives in a particular way because of electoral concerns. 
To the extent that they respond to today’s median voter, and to 
the extent that today’s median resembles the enacting median, 
such judges can be understood to act legalistically.  
 
 24. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bar-
gains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) (arguing for the use 
of positive political theory to interpret original legislative intent). 
 25. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
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weaker incentive to respond to the median voter when inter-
preting ambiguities. So scholars may face a choice. To get the 
searching judicial review that initiatives may warrant they 
may have to sacrifice the majoritarian interpretations that ini-
tiatives deserve.  
One clarification is in order. In this paper I focus only on 
judicial interpretation of initiatives, by which I mean plebi-
scites drafted by private individuals or groups and presented to 
the electorate for a vote. I include in that category indirect ini-
tiatives that were first presented to the legislature and then, 
after the legislature failed to approve them, presented to the 
electorate. I focus on both constitutional and statutory initia-
tives. I do not analyze referendums, by which I mean plebi-
scites involving laws that originated in the legislature.  
I.  THE INTERPRETATION DILEMMA   
For over a century Americans have used initiatives to 
make law at state and local levels,26 but the attendant ques-
tions about interpretation long escaped scholars’ notice. Profes-
sor Jane S. Schacter wrote the germinal article in 1995.27
A. HOW DO JUDGES INTERPRET INITIATIVES? 
 Her 
paper, like mine and most of the literature on the topic, divides 
the inquiry into two parts, one descriptive and one normative.  
Schacter began with the descriptive question, how do judg-
es interpret initiatives? She examined fifty-three cases in which 
judges interpreted statewide statutory initiatives.28 She found 
that in the “vast majority” of those cases, “courts declare[d] 
that their task is to locate the controlling popular intent behind 
the provision at issue.”29 Subsequent studies have generally 
supported her conclusion.30
 
 26. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 22–40 
(2009) (describing the Populist inception of direct democracy and its develop-
ment through the Progressive Era into the late twentieth century). 
 When faced with ambiguity in an 
initiative, courts ask what voters intended.  
 27. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent:” Interpretive Dilem-
mas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).  
 28. See id. at 114–17 (describing the criteria and geographic composition 
of the cases).  
 29. Id. at 117.  
 30. See, e.g., Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis 
of Proposition 209, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 12 (1999) (“When construing a con-
stitutional provision enacted by initiative, the intent of the voters is the para-
mount consideration.” (quoting Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 897, 900 
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What sources do courts use to ascertain voter intent? 
Schacter found that they rely heavily on the text of the initia-
tive in question.31 That is consistent with the common and sen-
sible (but not irrefutable) claim that the language of a law pro-
vides the best evidence of the lawmakers’ intentions.32 They 
also consider other legal texts, such as related statutes and of-
ficial ballot materials.33 Those materials, which are prepared by 
the government and made available to voters before the elec-
tion, typically contain the titles of the initiatives to be voted on, 
short summaries of them, their full texts, arguments by propo-
nents and opponents, and so forth.34
Interestingly, courts do not often rely on media. They do 
not consider news reports regarding the initiatives, editorials, 
political advertisements supporting or opposing them, en-
dorsements, or opinion polls.
  
35 Schacter found that paradoxi-
cal.36 Most voters rely heavily on media—and little on legal 
text—when forming their intentions and deciding how to vote.37
 
(Cal. 1990))); Glenn C. Smith, Solving the “Initiatory Construction” Puzzle 
(and Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor In-
tent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 261 (2007) (“[Courts] seek to discern the intent 
of the ‘legislators’ (citizen voters) who enacted the law in ques-
tion. . . . [I]nitiatory-construction commentators have discussed cases that con-
firm the point. Searching for voter intent . . . continues to be a staple of opin-
ion writing in California.”). But see Michael M. O’Hear, Statutory 
Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initia-
tives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283 (2003) (reviewing cases interpreting drug 
treatment initiatives and concluding that Schacter “may have overemphasized 
the role of popular intent”).  
 
Yet courts seeking voters’ intentions focus on text.  
 31. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 120–23 (noting an “almost exclusive 
focus” on “formal sources”).  
 32. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 357–
69 (2005) (detailing the debate between textualists and intentionalists as to 
the appropriate sources for discerning legislative intent).  
 33. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 120–23.  
 34. See id.  
 35. See id. (“With a single exception, the opinions studied never men-
tioned information provided to voters by the news media or by advertise-
ments.”). 
 36. See id. at 130–44 (noting this paradox “draws sharply into question 
the decipherability of mass electoral intentions”).  
 37. Id. (providing evidence); see Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct 
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclo-
sure Plus”, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1145–46, 1151–54, 1157–59 (2003) (explain-
ing how and why voters in direct democracy use heuristic cues); see also Eliza-
beth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign 
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296–99 (2005) 
(same); Press Release, Wash. Sec’y of State, Reed Asks Lawmakers to Trim 
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In summary, courts interpreting initiatives behave much 
like courts interpreting ordinary legislation.38 In both settings, 
judges often state that they seek the intent of the lawmakers, 
whether legislators or voters. They then try to identify that in-
tent by examining the text of the law and its legislative histo-
ry—committee reports and related sources for ordinary legisla-
tion, official ballot materials for initiatives.39
Courts in both settings are subject to the same two-
pronged criticism: group intent does not exist or cannot be as-
certained. Various scholars have made the point in various 
ways,
 
40
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with 
words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable 
number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving ma-
jority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different 
ideas and beliefs.  
 but perhaps Max Radin, writing in 1930, stated it best:  
  . . . The chances that of several hundred men each will have exact-
ly the same determinate situations in mind . . . are infinitesimally 
small. . . . Even if the contents of the minds of the legislature were 
uniform, we have no means of knowing that content . . . .41
Initiatives magnify the problems Radin identified. Voters far 
outnumber legislators, they have a weaker grasp on technical 
legal terms, and they are less likely to foresee the myriad situa-
tions to which a new law may apply.
  
42
 
Elections Costs (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/office/news_ 
releases.aspx (describing a recent effort by Washington’s Secretary of State to 
remove the text of initiatives from a distributed ballot pamphlet on the ground 
that “few people bother to read the entire text of a ballot measure”).  
 That means they will 
have mixed intent, nonsensical intent, or no intent at all on 
 38. See Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An 
Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487, 497 (1998) (discussing the processes judges follow in 
interpreting initiatives and stating, “[t]he result is an interpretive methodolo-
gy that identifies the same goal and proceeds in essentially the same manner 
as that used in interpreting legislatively enacted statutes”).  
 39. Id. at 497–99.  
 40. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16 (1997) 
(noting the search for legislative intent “does not square with some of the (few) 
generally accepted concrete rules of statutory construction”); Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).  
 41. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 
(1930).  
 42. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 126–30 (discussing these problems); 
see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 921 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“[I]nquiries into legislative intent are even more difficult than 
usual when the legislative body whose unified intent must be determined con-
sists of 825,162 Arkansas voters.”).  
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many questions. Even if voters do have an intent, judges can-
not possibly uncover it.  
California provides a helpful example. In 1982, voters 
there approved an initiative that established a statutory defini-
tion of insanity.43 Under the new law, sustaining an insanity 
defense required one to show that “he or she was incapable of 
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her 
act and of distinguishing right from wrong.”44 The conjunctive 
“and” made it harder to sustain an insanity defense—harder 
than it had been under the test in People v. Drew,45 which the 
initiative supplanted, and harder than it had been under the 
test in M’Naghten’s Case,46 which prevailed before Drew.47 In 
People v. Skinner,48 the Supreme Court of California interpret-
ed the initiative. The court concluded that the initiative “was 
intended to . . . restore the M’Naghten test.”49 Reaching that re-
sult required the court to correct a “draftsman’s error,”50 replac-
ing “and” with “or.” The notion that most voters understood—
and understood in the same way—the tests in M’Naghten and 
Drew, the relationship between those tests and the language 
quoted above, and the possibility that courts would correct the 
“error” in the initiative is “strikingly implausible.”51
For reasons like that Schacter calls the search for voter in-
tent “[i]ntractable” and “futile.”
 
52 Professor Glenn Smith calls 
voter intent an “illusory commodity.”53 Professor Chris Good-
man has written, “[i]t is truly a legal fiction to attempt to ascer-
tain a common intent from the millions of people who vote in 
favor of a particular ballot measure.”54
 
 43. See People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 753 (Cal. 1985).  
 Even if such an intent 
 44. Id.  
 45. 583 P.2d 1318, 1329 (Cal. 1978), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 25 (West 1999), as recognized in Skinner, 704 P.2d at 754.  
 46. (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719.  
 47. See Skinner, 704 P.2d at 754.  
 48. See id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. at 758.  
 51. Schacter, supra note 27, at 141.  
 52. Id. at 123, 153.  
 53. Smith, supra note 30, at 263–64.  
 54. Chris Chambers Goodman, Examining “Voter Intent” Behind Proposi-
tion 209: Why Recruitment, Retention, and Scholarship Privileges Should Be 
Permissible Under Article I, Section 31, 27 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 59, 72 
(2008). Of course, there are arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., Cathy R. 
Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A Proposed Model for Interpreting Ini-
tiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (supporting the search for voter 
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existed, courts could not find it. As Professor Philip Frickey ex-
plained, “the only practical way to attempt to investigate [vot-
ers’] motive would be to invade the sanctity of the secret ballot.” 
Even then “one might well end up with equivocal . . . data.”55
All of that criticism begs an important question. If judges 
cannot ascertain voter intent, what should they do instead?  
 
B. HOW SHOULD JUDGES INTERPRET INITIATIVES? 
Scholars have called for new approaches to the interpreta-
tion of initiatives. Schacter, for example, would like courts to 
use an interpretive regime specially designed for them.56 The 
regime would include “interpretive litigation,” which would al-
low litigants, intervenors, and amici curiae to “explore in depth 
and argue the merits of different plausible interpretations.”57 
She would also like courts to watch for “abuse” of the process.58 
Initiatives that are long, complex, full of jargon, characterized 
by “subliminally directed advertising,” or harmful to marginal-
ized groups should, in her view, be interpreted narrowly.59
Frickey also proposed reforms. He called for a “three-part 
canonical inquiry to interpreting ballot propositions.”
 
60 First, 
courts should work especially hard to avoid interpretations of 
initiatives that cast doubt on their constitutionality.61 Second, 
because direct democracy is “in derogation of republican gov-
ernment,” initiatives should be narrowly construed when they 
conflict with pre-existing laws.62 And third, substantive canons 
such as the rule of lenity should be given extra force where ini-
tiatives are concerned.63
Other proposals abound. Professor Glen Staszewski argues 
that under certain circumstances courts should resolve ambigu-
ities in initiatives consistent with the intent of their sponsors, 
not voters.
 
64
 
intent and proposing guidelines on how to discern it).  
 Some favor a “purposive or dynamic approach” to 
 55. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Can-
ons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 488–89 n.67.  
 56. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 152–64.  
 57. Id. at 155. 
 58. Id. at 157. 
 59. Id. at 156–59.  
 60. Frickey, supra note 55, at 522.  
 61. Id. at 512–17, 522. 
 62. Id. at 517–22.  
 63. See id. at 522–23. 
 64. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and 
Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 433–35 
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interpreting initiatives.65 Others argue that in order to encour-
age clear drafting, initiatives should be interpreted to the det-
riment of their drafters.66 Still others argue for broad interpre-
tations when initiatives address certain issues, such as 
redistricting, term limits, the advancement of marginalized 
groups, and narrow interpretations in other circumstances.67 
One paper argues that courts should look for the intent of “that 
voter who falls as far to the narrow side of center as the text al-
lows.”68
I do not purport in the preceding paragraphs to capture all 
details of the proposed reforms. Nor will I work systematically 
through their pros, which may be substantial, and their cons.
  
69
Direct democracy is a fundamentally majoritarian institu-
tion. Defending direct democracy in a speech, Theodore Roose-
velt thundered that “[n]o sane man who has been familiar with 
the government of this country for the last twenty years will 
complain that we have had too much of the rule of the majori-
ty.”
 
Instead I will highlight what I believe to be a commonality of 
every proposal: they do not further direct democracy’s purpose.  
70
 
(2003); see also Smith, supra note 
 In 1893, J.W. Sullivan argued that direct democracy 
would facilitate governance in accordance with “the conscience 
30 (refining and expanding Staszewski’s 
proposal); cf. Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referen-
dums, 7 ELECTION L.J. 49, 49–51 (2008) (arguing that referenda, which “ena-
ble[] citizens to ratify or reject statutes passed by a legislature,” should be in-
terpreted consistent with legislative intent).  
 65. Evan C. Johnson, Comment, People v. Floyd: An Argument Against 
Intentionalist Interpretation of Voter Initiatives, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981, 
983 (2005).  
 66. See generally D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, Interpreting the Products 
of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 224 (2009).  
 67. See Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2748, 2766–68 (2005); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democra-
cy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 35 (1997) (suggesting that courts dis-
tinguish between “structural” and “legislative” initiatives and treat them dif-
ferently).  
 68. Stephen Salvucci, Note, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: 
The Interpretation of Initiatives in California, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 884 
(1998). 
 69. For criticism of proposed reforms, especially those of Schacter, 
Frickey, or both, see generally Landau, supra note 38, at 490; John Copeland 
Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 535, 536; O’Hear, supra note 30, at 336; Smith, supra note 30, at 28; Note, 
Judicial Approach to Direct Democracy, supra note 67, at 2762. See also 
Frickey, supra note 55, at 492–94 (critiquing Schacter’s proposals).  
 70. ROOSEVELT, supra note 22, at 152.  
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of the majority.”71 His book helped place direct democracy on 
the national agenda.72 William Jennings Bryan, a leading advo-
cate of direct democracy, argued that the initiative “is the most 
effective means . . . for giving the people absolute control over 
their Government.”73 For him “the people” meant “the majori-
ty.”74 The Populists who agitated for direct democracy believed 
a “majority of the people . . . could never be corruptly influ-
enced.”75
I see no reason to believe that Schacter’s interpretive liti-
gation, or that Schacter and Frickey’s narrow constructions, 
will vindicate the will of the majority. Nor were they intended 
to.
  
76
Why might that be? The explanation, I believe, lies in a 
conflation. Scholars have mixed questions about the meaning of 
particular initiatives with normative judgments about the ini-
tiative process. Instead of determining the meaning of initia-
tives first and then making normative judgments about them, 
 I see no reason to believe that giving extra force to sub-
stantive canons of construction will either. Sponsor intent may 
not align with majority will, and interpreting initiatives to the 
detriment of sponsors may undercut majority will. In short, 
none of the proposed reforms, laudable though they may be in 
many regards, comports systematically with the core purpose of 
initiatives, which is to effectuate the will of the majority.  
 
 71. J.W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE CITIZENSHIP THROUGH 
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 7 (1892).  
 72. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PRO-
CESS IN AMERICA 28 (2002) (“Arguably the single most important event in the 
birth of the initiative and referendum in America was the publication . . . of a 
small book with the awkward title Direct Legislation by the Citizenship 
through the Initiative and Referendum. So electric was its impact that the title 
page of the 1893 edition boasted that it was ‘the book that started the Refer-
endum Movement.’”).  
 73. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, THE PEOPLE’S LAW 10 (1914).  
 74. See id. at 16–19 (discussing how simple majorities of voters decide 
whether initiatives take effect); see also MILLER, supra note 26, at 26 (“Bryan  
. . . believed that [the initiative power] should be made as robust as possible so 
that the majority could have its way.”).  
 75. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 45 (1989). 
 76. Schacter described her approach as “metademocratic.” Schacter, supra 
note 27, at 153. It would “further a larger vision of democracy,” id., by, for ex-
ample, “infusing the initiative lawmaking process with norms favoring delib-
eration and discouraging abuses of the process.” Id. at 161. Frickey argued 
that interpretation in this area should attempt to achieve two goals: “respect 
for direct democracy” and “respect for public values—especially constitutional 
values, including the republican value of representative government.” Frickey, 
supra note 55, at 510.  
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they start with normative judgments that drive the determina-
tion of meaning. Schacter, for example, worries about infor-
mation deficits on the part of voters, the lack of deliberation, 
and the ability of organized interest groups to abuse the initia-
tive process.77 Frickey was concerned with the lack of “robust” 
public consideration of initiatives and with strategic drafting 
and manipulation by sponsors.78
That approach can create at least two problems. First, the 
resulting prescriptions may be wrong. The initiative process is 
not always flawed or flawed in the same way. General interpre-
tative techniques designed to mitigate a flaw, or a set of flaws, 
may be inapt for any particular initiative.
 Those general concerns influ-
enced those scholars’ (and perhaps others’) views towards in-
terpretation.  
79
The rest of the paper separates the two lines of analysis. 
Rather than considering ambiguities in initiatives with an eye 
towards general problems with the process, I consider them 
with an eye towards the purpose of the process. That purpose is 
to further majority will. And that raises a question: Can we as-
certain the will of the majority and use it to resolve ambiguities 
in initiatives? Or is majority will, like voter intent, a rhetorical-
ly attractive but empty concept? 
 If they are suffi-
ciently inapt sufficiently often, their costs will exceed their 
benefits. Second, even if the techniques mitigate problems, they 
come at a price: difficulty in assessing the process. Observers 
may not know whether to attribute the successes and failures 
of initiatives to the process itself—direct voting by the people—
or to judges’ efforts to smooth the edges of the process with spe-
cialized interpretations. That could cloud the pros and cons of 
initiatives and stifle reforms.  
II.  MEDIAN DEMOCRACY AND MAJORITY WILL   
This Part relates the notion of majority will to a technical 
concept, the “Condorcet winner.” I define that concept and ex-
plain why the Condorcet winner among a set of policy proposals 
has an especially strong claim to being the majoritarian social 
 
 77. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 155–59. Many observers have ex-
pressed such concerns. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 64, at 412–35.  
 78. See Frickey, supra note 55, at 523 (arguing that his interpretive ap-
proach could help resolve those problems).  
 79. Schacter recognized this. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 160 (noting, 
for example, that a “universal rule of narrow construction applied to all initia-
tive laws . . . would be flawed in important respects”).  
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choice. I also explain why Condorcet winners do not usually ex-
ist when legislators vote on legislation but plausibly do exist 
when voters vote on initiatives. In the initiative setting, the 
Condorcet winner will tend to be the proposal favored by the 
median voter. Readers already familiar with these ideas can 
skip to Part III.  
In The Strategic Constitution, Professor Robert Cooter dis-
tinguishes between two systems for making collective decisions 
in a democracy.80 The first system, which he calls bargain de-
mocracy, is characterized by representatives of the citizenry 
compromising with one another across policy issues.81
Bargain democracy has many potential advantages, includ-
ing the ability to capture gains from trade. Just as a buyer and 
seller of goods both gain from a voluntary transaction—they 
must, otherwise they would not have engaged in it—buyers and 
sellers of votes gain too.
 When 
members of Congress engage in logrolling to pass a bill—you 
support my farm subsidies, I will support your environmental 
protections—they epitomize bargain democracy.  
82 The Congressman who supports farm 
subsidies and the Congresswoman who supports environmental 
protections exchange votes with one another to enact their fa-
vorite policies. That makes them better off and, if they accu-
rately represent their constituents, it can make society better 
off too.83
But bargain democracy has downsides, one of which is that 
it problematizes the concept of majority will. That is because 
bargain democracy usually fails to select from the menu of poli-
  
 
 80. See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 101–
70, 361–63 (2000) [hereinafter COOTER, STRATEGIC] (distinguishing median 
democracy, which involves issue-by-issue decision-making, from bargain de-
mocracy, which involves decision-making across issues); Robert Cooter, Consti-
tutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy Versus Median Democracy, 3 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 7 (2002).  
 81. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 361–63.  
 82. For the germinal analysis, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Single Sub-
ject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 831–36 (2006) 
(discussing potential consequences of logrolling).  
 83. Gilbert, supra note 82, at 836 (stating that “[i]f legislators accurately 
represent all of their constituents, then . . . legislators and citizens will gener-
ally experience the same effects from vote trading,” but noting that this is un-
realistic because preferences vary and some constituents “will benefit from a 
particular vote trade while others will suffer harm”).  
  
1634 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1621 
 
cy options the Condorcet winner—indeed, it usually precludes 
the existence of a Condorcet winner.  
The Condorcet winner is the proposal that would defeat all 
other proposals in a head-to-head vote under a system of major-
ity rule.84
The Condorcet winner has normative appeal. As Professor 
William Riker wrote,  
 To illustrate, if legislators consider three alternative 
policy proposals, X, Y, and Z, and if a majority prefers X to Y 
and X to Z, then X is the Condorcet winner. A majority prefers 
X to all alternatives.  
According to the first, “deeper” requirement of fairness and consisten-
cy, the Condorcet criterion, if an alternative beats (or ties) all others 
in pairwise contests, then it ought to win. This notion is closely relat-
ed to the notion of equality and “one man, one vote,” in the sense that, 
when an alternative opposed by a majority wins, quite clearly the 
votes of some people are not being counted the same as other people’s 
votes.85
Riker’s second sentence is most important for my purposes. The 
Condorcet winner can be said to capture, in a concrete way, ma-
jority will. It is the only alternative that a majority prefers to 
all others. If a decision-making process fails to select the Con-
dorcet winner, then majority will has not been actualized, be-
cause a majority would prefer the Condorcet winner. 
 
 To be clear, I am not arguing that the Condorcet winner is 
the best collective choice, only that it has special claim to being 
the majoritarian choice. Many scholars have argued along 
those lines.86
Under bargain democracy, there usually is no Condorcet 
winner. That is because bargain democracy involves multiple 
issues—you vote for my issue, I vote for yours—and in the 
  
 
 84. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 41.  
 85. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 100 (1982).  
 86. See, e.g., GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON 329 (2011) 
(“Condorcet voting is often considered the most majoritarian way to choose 
among three or more alternatives.”); Gerald H. Kramer, Some Procedural As-
pects of Majority Rule, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 264, 268 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (“When an alternative satisfies the 
Condorcet criterion, we can speak of the majority will . . . .”); cf. DUNCAN 
BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 57–58 (1958) (“[T]he 
majority candidate who, in a direct vote against them, would defeat each of the 
others . . . . ought to be elected . . . . [T]he claims of the Condorcet criterion to 
rightness seem to us much stronger than those of any other.”); Saul Levmore, 
Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. 
L. REV. 971, 994–95 (1989) (“[I]t is reasonable to proceed, as does virtually the 
entire collective choice literature, under the assumption that a Condorcet win-
ner is very desirable.”). 
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presence of multiple issues collective preferences are usually 
“intransitive,” which means they are circular.87 Social choice 
theorists have offered general analyses of the problem.88
Suppose three legislators are deciding whether to vote for 
three individual policy proposals, X, Y, and Z.
 Here I 
illustrate with an example.  
89
Readers unfamiliar with social choice theory might wonder 
if this circularity problem is common or the product of my styl-
ized example. The answer is the former. As you increase the 
number of voters and issues to better approximate the real 
world, intransitivity becomes almost certain.
 Suppose the 
policy proposals address unrelated matters. The first legislator 
supports X and X alone, the second supports Y and Y alone, and 
the third support Z and Z alone. Each feels so strongly about 
her favored policy that she would gladly accept either one of the 
disfavored policies to get it. So three packages of proposals—
XY, XZ, YZ—would defeat the status quo in a head-to-head 
vote. Among the packages, however, there may be no Condorcet 
winner. One majority (legislators 1 and 2) might prefer XY to 
XZ, while another majority (legislators 1 and 3) prefers XZ to 
YZ, and a third majority (legislators 2 and 3) prefers YZ to XY. 
Their collective preferences run in circles, and consequently 
there is no Condorcet winner.  
90
Intransitivity does not condemn bargain democracy, and 
nor does it often occur. Structural mechanisms like agenda set-
ting and stable bargaining among politicians can prevent legis-
latures from spinning their wheels, even if the underlying pref-
erences of legislators are circular.
  
91
 
 87. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 
 But intransitivity does 
80, at 37–40.  
 88. For an accessible discussion with cites to the original work, see 
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALI-
TY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 49–102 (1997).  
 89. For a fuller discussion, see Gilbert, supra note 82, at 833–36.  
 90. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 42 (“Voter preferences often 
form intransitive cycles when political choices occur in multiple dimensions.”); 
RIKER, supra note 85, at 121 (“[A]s the number of voters and alternatives in-
creases, so do the number of profiles without a Condorcet winner.”); SHEPSLE 
& BONCHEK, supra note 88, at 101 (“In multidimensional spatial settings, ex-
cept in the case of a rare distribution of ideal points (like radial symmetry) 
that hardly ever occurs naturally . . . . [T]here will be chaos—no Condorcet 
winner, anything can happen . . . .”). These conclusions follow from important 
papers, including Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional 
Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 
472 (1976).  
 91. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 43–46. These conclusions 
follow from important papers, including Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Ar-
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mean that in the context of bargain democracy we can only talk 
of majority will in a limited way.92
Now consider Cooter’s second system for making collective 
decisions in a democracy, median democracy. This system is 
characterized by representatives of the citizenry, or even citi-
zens themselves, making decisions issue-by-issue.
 Anytime legislation passes, 
we can say that a majority prefers that legislation to the status 
quo. But we cannot say that a majority prefers that legislation 
to all alternatives.  
93
Under median democracy, voters cannot capture gains 
from trade. Median democracy requires them, whether they are 
legislators or lay citizens, to decide each issue individually, 
with no opportunity to make concessions on one in exchange for 
favors on another.
 If members 
of Congress voted on a particular farm subsidy only, with no 
thoughts of past or future votes on other issues, and then did 
the same for a particular provision about the environment, that 
would epitomize median democracy.  
94
Consider this example. Three voters are choosing from 
three tax rates. The conservative voter prefers 5%, the liberal 
voter prefers 15%, and the moderate voter prefers 10%. As tax-
es go above or below a voter’s ideal rate, that voter becomes less 
and less happy. The moderate is the median voter—one voter 
prefers a higher rate than she, and one prefers a lower rate. 
Her preferred rate, 10%, defeats each alternative rate 2-to-1 in 
a head-to-head vote.
 But median democracy has an important 
upside: it can select a Condorcet winner, and under certain as-
sumptions it will.  
95
 
rangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 23, 31–33 (1979).  
 The median voter’s ideal point is the 
Condorcet winner.  
 92. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 42 (“Political philosophy 
typically justifies laws enacted in a democracy on the grounds that they repre-
sent the ‘will of the majority’ or the ‘intent of the people’s representatives.’ 
Given intransitive voting, however, these phrases make no sense. Intransitive 
voters have no collective ‘will’ because they contradict themselves.”). 
 93. See id. at 25–35, 361–63.  
 94. This can lead to problems. Voters must make decisions about a single 
issue even when they have non-separable preferences across issues, that is, 
even when their optimal decision on that one issue depends on what happens 
with other issues. For a discussion, see Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, A 
Problem with Referendums, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6–8, 10–16 (2000).  
 95. The conservative and the moderate prefer 10% to 15%, the moderate 
and liberal prefer 10% to 5%.  
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The example can be generalized. When voters cast votes on 
a single policy issue (in the example, tax rates), and when vot-
ers have single-peaked preferences (the further policy moves 
from their preferred point, whether it is 5% or 10% or whatev-
er, the less happy they become), then the median voter’s ideal 
point is always the Condorcet winner.96 A series of pairwise 
votes among the options—5% versus 10%, 10% versus 15%, and 
so forth—will lead inevitably to the selection of the policy that 
the median voter most prefers. Once selected, that policy can-
not be defeated by an alternative. That result, well-known in 
political science, is the median voter theorem.97
The theorem explains why Cooter calls his second decision-
making system median democracy.
  
98
The theorem leads to this important point. In the context of 
median democracy, we can talk about majority will in a rich 
fashion. After a complete series of votes, we cannot only say 
that a majority prefers the policy left standing to the status 
quo. We can say a majority prefers it to all alternative policies.
 Under that system, and 
when the conditions in the prior paragraph hold, policy on each 
issue will gravitate towards the median voter’s ideal point.  
99
When in the United States do we make collective decisions 
under a system of median democracy? When we vote on initia-
tives, or so one can reasonably argue.
 
100 On many issues voters 
plausibly have single-peaked preferences, and many initiatives 
are limited to a single issue. That may be because initiatives 
are more likely to pass when so limited. Adding extra issues 
can increase opposition, the argument goes, so initiative spon-
sors have an incentive to limit them to one.101
 
 96. There is an additional requirement: there is a unique median. See PE-
TER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 162 (1986).  
 In addition, most 
 97. The theorem was developed in BLACK, supra note 86, at 56–57. For an 
accessible discussion, see COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 25–27.  
 98. See, COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 361. 
 99. I am still assuming that the conditions specified above are satisfied.  
 100. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 145 (“In general, direct de-
mocracy factors [i.e., separates] the issues, so the median voter should pre-
vail.” (emphasis removed)).  
 101. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-
Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 961 
(2005) (“The addition of a second, third, or fourth dimension [to a ballot initia-
tive] is political suicide because it increases the possibility of generating oppo-
sition.”). Of course, adding issues can also increase support. See Gilbert, supra 
note 82, at 831–36 (discussing logrolling in legislatures, the practice of com-
bining provisions, each supported by a minority, into one bill supported by a 
majority).  
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states have a “single subject rule” which is designed to limit in-
itiatives to a single issue.102 Evidence suggests that the rule 
does, in fact, limit the scope of some initiatives.103
To summarize, bargain and median democracy are alterna-
tive systems for making decisions in a democracy. Each has 
pros and cons, and each has implications for majority will. Un-
der bargain democracy, we have only a thin conception of ma-
jority will. We can state that a majority prefers every proposal 
that passes to the status quo, but we cannot state that a major-
ity prefers a particular proposal to all others. Under median 
democracy, we have a thicker conception of majority will. There 
is a Condorcet winner, at least some of the time and maybe 
much of the time. The majority prefers that policy to all alter-
natives. To effectuate that policy, many argue, is to effectuate 
majority will. Voting on initiatives often epitomizes median 
democracy.  
 
To be clear, the initiative process may not epitomize ideal 
median democracy. Eligible voters outnumber registered vot-
ers, and registered voters outnumber actual voters. Conse-
quently, those who vote on initiatives may be unrepresentative 
of society.104 Those who vote may lack full information about in-
itiatives,105 they may be fooled or manipulated by initiative 
sponsors or opponents,106 and they may vote inconsistently with 
their own preferences.107
 
 102. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democ-
racy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 704–12 (2010). 
 Voters may approve initiatives that 
 103. See Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence From 
Single Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 345–46 (2011) (finding 
fewer subjects in ballot propositions that judges do not strike down on single 
subject grounds than in propositions they do, suggesting that the rule deters 
multidimensional propositions).  
 104. See, e.g., DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT 
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 100–21 (1984) (providing evidence that 
only a non-representative subset of voters vote on initiatives). 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 127–44 (showing that initiatives and ballot pamphlets 
are difficult to read and that high percentages of voters report being confused 
by some initiatives); see also Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct 
Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 307, 312–17 (2010) (providing evidence that 
significant numbers of voters knew nothing about the initiatives in the study 
and that some voters made “erratic” choices when voting).  
 106. See, e.g., SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: 
OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 18 (1998) (describing how interest 
groups sometimes place propositions on the ballot that conflict with others on 
the ballot in order to “confuse voters” and make the ballot “so long that voters 
out of frustration and fatigue vote No on all measures”).  
 107. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 104, at 144 (reporting a survey show-
ing three-quarters of voters on a rent control proposition in California failed to 
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are attractive as standalone policies but problematic when cou-
pled with other policies.108
Those concerns are important in general but largely irrele-
vant for this paper. Recall that I am separating questions of in-
terpretation from normative judgments about the initiative 
process, including judgments premised on the above concerns. 
Doing so leads to new insights about interpretation, which is 
my focus. As it turns out, however, those insights point to at 
least one new method for addressing some of the above con-
cerns, as I explain in Part IV.  
  
III.  VOTER INTENT REVISITED   
With ideas from Part II in hand, I return to the question of 
interpreting initiatives. Recall that judges confronting ambigui-
ties in initiatives seek, or claim to seek, to resolve them in ac-
cordance with voter intent. Scholars dismiss that. They argue 
that voters typically have different intents, or no intent at all, 
with respect to the often obscure and complicated questions 
that arise in litigation. That is clearly correct, but it may miss 
the point.  
We need not understand judges to seek, literally, the intent 
of voters. Instead, we can understand them to be searching for 
the Condorcet winner. In other words, we can understand them 
to be asking this question: among plausible interpretations, 
which one would the voters who voted on the initiative have 
preferred to all others?109
 
match their policy views on that subject with their votes); David Fleischer, 
Prop. 8 by the Numbers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A15 (“Polling suggests 
that half a million people who opposed same-sex marriage mistakenly voted 
against the proposition. They were confused by the idea that a “no” vote was 
actually a vote for gay marriage.”).  
  
 108. See Lacy & Niou, supra note 94, at 12–13 (describing how separate 
votes on initiatives can lead to passage of a combination of initiatives that vot-
ers unanimously oppose). For an interesting, plausible example of the prob-
lems Lacy and Niou identify, see BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 106, at 
118–19 (describing how, in 1908, Oregon voters simultaneously approved two 
ballot measures, one restricting fishing upstream on the Columbia River and 
the other restricting fishing downstream, and together closing much of the 
river to fishing despite the importance of fishing to the economy).  
 109. This is a version of imaginative reconstruction, where “the interpreter 
tries to discover ‘what the law-maker meant by assuming his position.’” 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION 226 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 
COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907)). Imaginative reconstruction does not neces-
sarily have a clear objective. See id. at 227 (“It is not clear that imaginative 
reconstruction can avoid the . . . problems of specific intent theory . . . . Whose 
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To begin, my claim is positive and interpretive. I tentative-
ly hypothesize that judges are already doing this, or at least 
that we can sensibly understand them to be trying to do this. 
They may not ask themselves the actual question posed in the 
prior paragraph, but they pursue other inquiries and use inter-
pretive tools that tend to yield the same answer that they 
would have given had they asked the question. I have no hard 
evidence that this is true, but a few observations support it.  
Consider first judges’ language. When judges say they seek 
“voter intent”110 or the “intent of the electorate,”111 they might 
mean that they seek the actual intent of individual voters. That 
is what commentators think they mean, and that search is 
fruitless for the reasons discussed. But there is an alternative. 
They might mean that they seek the interpretation that voters, 
as a group, would have selected had the question been put to 
them. That seems consistent with their language, and that 
search is not fruitless, at least as a matter of theory. Had vot-
ers been asked to vote over the alternative interpretations, they 
would have settled on a particular one: the Condorcet winner.112
Consider also the case of Skinner.
 
That does not mean that all voters intended that interpretation 
to control, but it does mean no majority would have preferred 
an alternative interpretation.  
113 There the California 
Supreme Court made it easier to sustain an insanity defense by 
rewriting an initiative so that it said “or” instead of “and.”114
 
intent should the interpreter reconstruct?”). Under my theory it does have a 
clear objective: to identify the Condorcet winner. For a Condorcet winner to 
exist, one must be able to situate the plausible interpretations on a single di-
mension—for example, narrower interpretations on one end, broader interpre-
tations on the other—and voters must have single-peaked preferences over the 
plausible interpretations. As discussed, voters may not always have single-
peaked preferences, but they probably have them some of the time, and they 
may have them often.  
 If 
the text generally provides the best evidence of voter intent 
(presuming intent exists), then one might argue that the deci-
sion was wrongheaded. As Chief Justice Bird wrote in dissent, 
 110. See supra Part I.A.  
 111. See, e.g., Outfitter Props., L.L.C. v. Wildlife Conservation Bd., 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 312, 316 (Cal. App. 2012) (“In interpreting statutory language adopt-
ed by voter initiative, our primary task is to determine the intent of the elec-
torate . . . .”).  
 112. I assume voters vote on pairwise combinations—for example, A versus 
B, and then B versus C, and so forth—and discard proposals that lose.  
 113. People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d. 752 (Cal.1985). 
 114. Id. at 758. 
  
2013] INTERPRETING INITIATIVES 1641 
 
“[t]here is nothing . . . that implies that the electorate intended 
‘and’ to be ‘or.’ . . . [I]t is not within this court’s power to ignore 
the expression of popular will and rewrite the statute.”115 But if 
I am right and judges seek Condorcet winners, then the deci-
sion may seem more palatable. The court concluded that “and” 
could be a draftsman’s error, so the language was ambiguous.116 
We can understand the court to have then sought the interpre-
tation the median voter would have preferred. That there was 
no public outcry after Skinner, that prosecutors and defense 
lawyers “lauded the court” for its decision,117 and that voters in 
the twenty-seven years since have not bothered to overturn it 
provides at least some evidence that the court’s guess about the 
median voter’s preferences was about right.118
Finally, consider judges’ incentives. Many state courts 
judges, who are primarily responsible for ironing out ambigui-
ties in initiatives, are subject to elections of one form or anoth-
er. The median voter theorem predicts that in elections with 
two candidates, the one closest to the middle of the political 
spectrum—the median voter’s ideal point—will prevail.
 Skinner is just 
an anecdote, of course, but it is suggestive.  
119
Some judges do not compete against another candidate in 
their elections but rather face retention elections. In such elec-
tions, the incumbent judge, and that judge alone, appears on 
the ballot, and voters are asked whether they wish to retain 
him or replace him.
 One 
way judges can signal their proximity to the median voter is to 
resolve ambiguities in ways consistent with the median voter’s 
preferences.  
120 If a majority votes to replace, a new judge 
is selected.121
 
 115. Id. at 766 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).  
 Because there is only one candidate, the median 
voter theorem does not directly apply to retention elections, but 
 116. Id. at 758. 
 117. Dan Morain, Court Rewrites Insanity Defense Rule: Prosecution, De-
fense Advocates Both Praise Return to Earlier Standard, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
1985, at 3. 
 118. I am grateful to UVA’s excellent research librarian, Benjamin 
Doherty, for help in examining the history and (as it turns out non-existent) 
fallout of Skinner.  
 119. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 25–27 (“[T]he winning plat-
form in certain conditions is the one favored by the citizen who is the median 
in the statistical distribution of political sentiment.”).  
 120. E.g., Judicial Retention Elections, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www 
.iowacourts.gov/Public_Information/About_Judges/Retention/ (last visited Apr. 
4, 2013). 
 121. Id. 
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its logic is not irrelevant. A judge who interprets ambiguities 
consistent with the preferences of the median voter probably 
has a higher chance of being retained than a judge who fills 
gaps in politically extreme ways.  
Appointed judges also may have an incentive to cater to 
the median. Although such judges are not directly accountable 
to the public, the person who appoints them, typically the gov-
ernor, is.122
No judicial selection method is perfect. In the election set-
ting, voters often lack information about judicial candidates.
 The logic of the median voter theorem usually will 
compel gubernatorial candidates to align their positions with 
those favored by the median voter. They can do so by, among 
other things, selecting or promising to select judges who will in-
terpret ambiguities consistent with the median’s preference. 
That may give sitting judges who seek reappointment (or 
would-be judges who seek an initial appointment) some incen-
tive to attend to the median.  
123 
Judges, whether elected or appointed, sometimes may be better 
off catering to narrow interest groups than to the median vot-
er.124 Some judges may ignore their reelection or reappointment 
prospects when making official decisions.125
 
 122. See, e.g., Judicial Appointments, OFF. OF GOVERNOR MARK DAYTON, 
http://mn.gov/governor/appointments/judicial-appointments/ (last visited Apr. 
4, 2013) (explaining that the Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection rec-
ommends district court judge candidates to the governor for appointment). 
 Consequently, in-
 123. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
43, 53–54, 59–72 (2003) (explaining that the vast majority of voters do not un-
derstand the candidates or issues, leading to high percentages of voter apathy 
in judicial elections). 
 124. For evidence that state judges sometimes respond to narrow interests, 
including political cronies and campaign contributors, rather than the median 
voter, see, for example, Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explana-
tions for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 190, 215 & n.185 (1993) (“Successful [judicial] candidates would 
have obligations to their supporters and grudges against their opponents.”); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 
623, 649–50 (2008) (explaining that campaign contributions may directly in-
fluence judges to rule in favor of contributors or indirectly by increasing the 
likelihood that judges who “share the interest groups’ preferences” stay in 
power); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial 
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1063, 1064–65 (2010) 
(“[S]tudies have shown that elected judges disproportionately rule in favor of 
their campaign contributors.”). 
 125. Or they might pay close attention. See, e.g., Gregory A. Huber & San-
ford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for 
Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (finding evidence that some state 
judges increase prison sentences as their reelections approach).  
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terpreting initiatives consistent with the median voter’s prefer-
ences may not be critical to state judges’ careers. That does not 
undermine my argument. I do not claim that judges always in-
terpret initiatives to satisfy the median. I simply claim that 
many judges have some incentive to attend to the median and 
that sometimes they may act on that incentive.126
To the extent career concerns make judges responsive to 
the median voter, they presumably make them responsive to 
today’s median voter.
 
127
For that and other reasons, I do not claim, and I cannot 
show, that courts are searching, definitively, for the interpreta-
tion the enacting median voter would have preferred. My claim 
is that they are plausibly, perhaps unconsciously progressing 
towards this. 
 My claim is that we can understand 
judges to seek the preferred interpretation of the enacting me-
dian voter. The two do not necessarily differ, or differ much. 
Preferences on some issues may be stable, especially over short 
periods, and the time between enactment and interpretation is 
often short. But of course they can differ.  
If I am right, then this analysis helps clarify, for scholars 
and perhaps for judges themselves, decades of judicial practice. 
When judges interpret initiatives, we need not understand 
them to be searching in vain for a clear and unified intent 
among thousands of scattered and heterogeneous voters. In-
stead, we can understand them to be searching for the unique 
interpretation that voters as a group would have selected had 
they been given the chance. When seen through this lens, voter 
intent is not an “illusory commodity”128
This might give pause to scholars who have proposed new 
approaches to the interpretation of initiatives. If the conven-
tional approach—seeking voter intent—is not fatally flawed, 
then perhaps new approaches are unwarranted. On the other 
 but a concrete and trac-
table concept.  
 
 126. That incentive is not entirely accidental; judicial elections were de-
signed in part to make judges more accountable to the public. See generally 
Nelson, supra note 124, at 224 (“Since all officials tended to act out of self-
interest, the trick was to align their interests with those of the people.”); 
Shugerman, supra note 124, at 1067–68 (explaining that supporters of judicial 
elections wanted to check the legislative and executive branches and make the 
judiciary more responsive to the defense of the peoples’ constitutional rights).  
 127. Judges may even respond to tomorrow’s median if they think they can 
forecast where public sentiment will lie when their reelection or reappoint-
ment date arrives.  
 128. Smith, supra note 30, at 263–64. 
  
1644 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1621 
 
hand, the evidence for my theory might be unpersuasive, or 
even if it is persuasive one might argue that searching for the 
preference of the median voter is not desirable. Or perhaps it is 
so difficult as to be pointless or, because it vests judges with 
discretion, dangerous. The next Part addresses some of those 
issues.  
IV.  THE CASE FOR THE CONDORCET WINNER   
This Part addresses the normative question, how should 
courts interpret initiatives? The answer I explore is simple, at 
least as a matter of theory: give ambiguous initiatives the in-
terpretation the median voter—by which I mean the median 
among those who voted on the initiative—would have pre-
ferred. If my hypothesis in Part III is correct and we can under-
stand judges to be doing this already, or struggling towards it, 
then this is a justification of existing practice. If my hypothesis 
is wrong, then it is an exploration of a new idea, albeit one con-
sistent with the language courts already use to describe their 
approach to the problem. It is also consonant with the purpose 
of the institution, and therein lies the heart of the argument. 
Direct democracy is a fundamentally majoritarian institu-
tion. Earlier in the paper I provided quotes from political fig-
ures to support that statement.129 Language from legal scholars 
and judges supports it too. Professor Julian Eule, a prominent 
scholar of direct democracy, wrote: “Majoritarian democracy 
. . . is the core of our constitutional system. . . . [T]he plebiscite 
certainly seems to have a strong claim to being its most treas-
ured instrument.”130 In 1919, the Supreme Court of Washington 
stated that citizens adopted direct democracy “because they 
had become impressed with a profound conviction that the Leg-
islature had ceased to be responsive to the popular will.”131
 
 129. See supra Part I.B.  
 I 
 130. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 
1503, 1513 (1990); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s 
Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1978) (“[Reviewing initia-
tives] involve[s] the difficult task of balancing the statutory rights of minori-
ties against the majority’s desire to implement its will.”); Eule, supra, at 1514 
(criticizing direct democracy and stating: “The gap between the will of the ma-
jority and the voice of the legislature, it turns out, is there by constitutional 
design.”). To be clear, and notwithstanding the quote in the text, Eule did not 
believe the federal Constitution itself is especially majoritarian in character. 
See id. at 1522–30 (explaining how the Constitution “filters” and limits majori-
ty will).  
 131. State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 922 (Wash. 1919).  
  
2013] INTERPRETING INITIATIVES 1645 
 
could provide many more quotes from many more sources.132
The rest of the argument follows from that premise. If di-
rect democracy aims to empower the majority, then one might 
reason that courts should interpret the products of direct de-
mocracy in majoritarian-empowering ways. To do otherwise 
would undercut the institution. Judges are supposed to review 
initiatives for constitutionality, and perhaps review them with 
special care,
 
Stating that direct democracy is designed to be majoritarian is 
not controversial. 
133 but few would argue that they should undercut 
the institution that produces them.134
That second argument merits closer attention. As dis-
cussed, scholars have suggested new methods for interpreting 
initiatives.
 Doing so could put pres-
sure on judges who stand between democratic majorities and 
the interpretations those voters preferred. It could also prevent 
voters from reaping all of the benefits—and observing and pay-
ing all of the costs—of direct democracy.  
135 Some of their suggestions are motivated by a de-
sire to mitigate common (or at least commonly perceived) prob-
lems with direct democracy.136
 
 132. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993), aff’d by 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (noting that an initiative deserved “great 
deference” from courts because its support “by a majority of voters” constituted 
“an expression of popular will”); MILLER, supra note 
 Even if their proposals would 
mitigate those problems, they may come at a cost: they may 
make it harder to assess the institution. Observers may not 
know whether to attribute the successes and failures of initia-
tives to the initiative process itself or to the process in combina-
tion with judges using specialized interpretive techniques. 
Without a clear picture of the process, it may be difficult to un-
derstand and reform it. Separating the question of interpreta-
tion from normative judgments about the process would yield 
26, at 90 (stating that 
Justice Black once told then-Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall that his 
challenge to an initiative had less force because initiatives “let[] the people of 
the State—the voters of the State—establish their policy, which is as near to a 
democracy as you can get”). 
 133. See Eule, supra note 130, at 1558 (calling for a “hard judicial look” for 
initiatives).  
 134. Frickey may be understood to have taken that position. He argued for 
narrow construction of initiatives on the ground that they are “in derogation of 
republican government.” See Frickey, supra note 55, at 522. But I do not think 
he understood himself to take that position. He argued that none of his pro-
posals “seem[] insufficiently respectful of direct democracy because, under 
each of them, the core purposes of the electorate are protected.” Id. at 523. 
 135. See supra Part I.A. 
 136. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
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the opposite virtue and vice. It may not mitigate problems with 
the process, but it may make those problems plain. That ap-
proach may facilitate accurate assessments and reforms, and 
that outcome may be better for those concerned about direct 
democracy’s problems than the alternative.  
If judges want to interpret initiatives in majoritarian ways, 
then a natural approach would be to search among plausible 
interpretations for the one that the median voter among those 
who voted on the initiative would have preferred. To select a 
different interpretation would undermine majority will by pro-
ducing a result that a majority of those who voted on the origi-
nal initiative would, if they could, immediately vote to change. 
I can strengthen this line of reasoning with an analogy. 
Suppose that two initiatives appear on the ballot at the same 
time. Like the initiative in Skinner, suppose that both address 
the insanity defense, but one says “and” (hard to sustain an in-
sanity defense) and the other says “or” (easier to sustain an in-
sanity defense). As sometimes happens, suppose a majority pre-
fers both proposals to the status quo, and both pass.137 Because 
of the conflict in language, both cannot take effect. In this situ-
ation, courts in many states follow the highest vote rule, which 
directs them to give force to the initiative that received the 
greatest number of affirmative votes and to invalidate the com-
peting measure.138 The logic is simple: as the Supreme Court of 
Colorado wrote, “the recipient of the greatest popular support[] 
will be given effect” because it expresses “the predominant will 
of the people.”139 Put differently, courts should choose the initia-
tive that “the people” prefer, which is the one that received 
more votes.140
Now suppose that instead of two initiatives, there is only 
one on the ballot. It passes, and it has a genuinely ambiguous 
provision. There are good reasons to believe “and” means “and,” 
  
 
 137. See Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, Less Can Be More: Con-
flicting Ballot Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 383 
(2009) (discussing and providing examples of conflicting initiatives that pass 
simultaneously).  
 138. Id. at 387–89.  
 139. In re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill 
1078, 536 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1975).  
 140. See id. The highest vote rule does not always achieve its intended re-
sult. See Gilbert & Levine, supra note 137, at 389 (“Contrary to intuition, the 
highest vote rule can thwart majority will by enacting voters’ second-choice 
proposal (or worse) instead of their first.”). For a model explaining why that is 
so, see id. at 389–93.  
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and there are good reasons to believe “and” means “or.” Which 
interpretation should courts choose? The analogy to the prior 
scenario with two initiatives seems strong. If one agrees that 
courts in that prior scenario are right to seek among the com-
peting initiatives the one that a majority prefers, then perhaps 
courts should do the same here.  
This discussion leads to an important point: if courts want 
majoritarian interpretations, they should focus on the median 
among all voters, including those who opposed the initiative in 
question. That may seem counterintuitive, but in fact it is es-
sential, because doing otherwise would thwart majority will. 
The following example shows why.  
In 2004, voters in Michigan approved Proposal 2, a consti-
tutional initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage.141 The key 
language of the proposal reads: “[T]he union of one man and 
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized 
as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”142 The last 
phrase, “for any purpose,” was the subject of a recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of Michigan.143 The question the court 
faced was whether that phrase prohibits public employers from 
providing health insurance benefits to employees’ same-sex 
domestic partners.144
Suppose that Michigan had only five voters, and suppose 
one could arrange them from left to right, where Voter 1 had 
the most liberal views of same-sex relationships and Voter 5 
had the most conservative views. Suppose that Voters 3, 4, and 
5 voted in favor of Proposal 2, giving it the majority it needed to 
become law. Suppose that Voter 3 understood the disputed lan-
guage to ban same-sex marriage but not to prohibit the health 
insurance benefits. Voter 4 understood the language to ban 
same-sex marriage and also to prohibit the benefits. If a court 
interpreting the language focused on the median voter among 
only those who approved the law, it would select the interpreta-
tion favored by Voter 4. But that would be anti-majoritarian. A 
majority, Voters 1, 2, and 3, would prefer Voter 3’s interpreta-
  
 
 141. For a discussion of Proposal 2 and the problems initiatives like it 
raise, see generally Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democra-
cy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17 (2006).  
 142. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.  
 143. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 
532 (Mich. 2008).  
 144. Id. at 529.  
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tion. Voter 3 is the median among all voters, and her preferred 
interpretation is the Condorcet winner.  
This leads to an important point: courts should be wary of 
the interpretation favored by an initiative’s drafters, even if 
those drafters understand the initiative best. Drafters, one 
might suppose, typically have strong feelings on the subject of 
the initiative and relatively extreme views. Otherwise they 
would not incur the costs necessary to place an initiative on the 
ballot. Their views may differ substantially from the median 
voter’s. After Proposal 2 passed in Michigan, one of its authors 
argued that the initiative’s broad language not only prohibited 
same-sex marriage, it prohibited benefits for same-sex part-
ners.145
This discussion gives rise to an important limiting princi-
ple. When I suggest that courts give ambiguous initiatives the 
interpretation the median voter would prefer, I mean the inter-
pretation the median voter would prefer among plausible inter-
pretations. I do not suggest that courts, upon encountering any 
ambiguity, should seek to replace it with the median voter’s 
ideal interpretation. Ambiguities are ubiquitous; different 
judges can in good faith find ambiguities in many circumstanc-
es. Replacing all ambiguities with the median voter’s ideal 
point would be radical. Nearly every initiative garnering major-
ity support, no matter its text and purpose, could be trans-
formed by judicial interpretation into the policy most favored 
by the median. That could eviscerate the meaning of, and the 
ability of actors to rely on, legal language.
 That might have reflected the author’s sincere under-
standing of the initiative from the outset. But as the five-voter 
illustration makes clear, that understanding, if adopted by 
courts, could be anti-majoritarian.  
146
My position is more modest. I suggest that courts, upon en-
countering an ambiguity, should identify all plausible interpre-
tations of the language in question. That universe will depend 
on the exact arguments made by the parties, the text of the ini-
tiative, the ballot pamphlets and other extrinsic aids judges 
consult, and judges’ varying philosophies. I make one observa-
tion in that regard: if a majority of those who voted on the ini-
 
 
 145. See Staszewski, supra note 141, at 19.  
 146. Notwithstanding the decision in Skinner, which rewrote the initiative 
in question but provoked little public response, I believe, and I think most oth-
ers do too, that some actors rely in important ways on legal language some of 
the time. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. Interpreting initia-
tives without the limiting principle I discuss would undermine their ability to 
do that.  
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tiative would have preferred the status quo that prevailed be-
forehand to a particular interpretation, then that interpreta-
tion is not plausible. Once courts have winnowed the field to 
plausible interpretations, and regardless of how they have done 
so, then I suggest that they should search among those inter-
pretations for the one the median voter would have preferred.  
That leads to the practical question: how are courts sup-
posed to identify the median’s preferred interpretation? My 
principal goal is to uncover a coherent objective for courts in-
terpreting initiatives, not to chart a precise course for achieving 
it, but I do have one comment and one suggestion. The com-
ment is that identifying a coherent objective could lead to help-
ful innovations by lawyers and litigants. Providing a target 
could lead to new approaches and arguments that help judges 
to strike that target. The suggestion pertains to evidence. 
Courts could augment their analysis by permitting litigants to 
introduce, and by taking seriously, opinion polls. Returning to 
Michigan’s Proposal 2, a poll conducted shortly before the elec-
tion showed that while half of respondents favored a ban on gay 
marriage, over sixty percent of them opposed denying benefits 
to public employees’ same-sex partners.147 That suggests that 
an interpretation of Proposal 2 that only banned gay marriage 
and left benefits intact would have aligned more closely with 
the median voter’s preference.148
Opinion polls have weaknesses. In the Michigan example, 
the poll was taken close to the time of the vote,
 
149 but others 
may not be, raising questions about whether they capture the 
views of the enacting median voter. More generally, polls may 
raise more questions than answers, and that in turn may give 
judges discretion subject to abuse.150
 
 147. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc., 748 N.W.2d at 547–48 (Kelly, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing those polls).  
 If on average polls do more 
 148. See id. Many interpreters focused on voter intent in the conventional 
(and many scholars would argue fanciful) sense may have reached the same 
proposed result: gay marriage is banned but employee benefits remain. See, 
e.g., id. at 552. That buttresses my descriptive claim in Part III insofar as it 
suggests that decisions rooted in voter intent can be understood, and under-
stood with greater precision, as decisions aimed at majority will. The Supreme 
Court of Michigan did not adopt the proposed interpretation. See id. at 543 
(majority opinion) (holding that Proposal 2 forbids the provision of benefits to 
same-sex domestic partners).  
 149. See id. at 547 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that Michigan poll was 
taken in August 2004). 
 150. Cf. Schacter, supra note 27, at 144–45 (arguing that permitting judges 
to consider extrinsic sources, such as media, when interpreting initiatives 
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harm than good, then perhaps judges should never use them, 
even if they could help in some cases. Because of those compli-
cations I do not argue that courts should give decisive weight to 
polls. I just suggest that if courts seek the interpretation pre-
ferred by the enacting median, polls may sometimes help.  
Polls may have another virtue. Recall that those who vote 
on initiatives are not necessarily representative of all voters, let 
alone society at large.151 They may lack complete information 
about initiatives, and they may be confused or even deceived.152 
Many observers criticize direct democracy on those grounds.153
Those ideas raise interesting and hard questions, such as 
whether citizens who did not vote on an initiative should have 
any influence in determining its meaning. I take no position on 
that. I only note that polls could be used for multiple ends.  
 
Using opinion polls to resolve ambiguities in initiatives could 
mitigate those problems. Poll respondents may be more repre-
sentative of society than the subset of voters who voted on the 
initiative, and pollsters could—I repeat, could—frame issues 
more clearly than initiative sponsors.  
I conclude with an observation and a qualification. The ob-
servation is about judges. Earlier I noted that state judges, be-
cause of their accountability, may have an incentive to inter-
pret initiatives consistent with the preference of today’s median 
voter. Ordinarily we would condemn judicial decisions that re-
sult from political calculations,154
 
could make the search for voter intent even less determinate).  
 but when it comes to the in-
terpretation of initiatives that reaction may be unjustified. This 
Article suggests that majoritarian interpretations are not only 
consistent with the language courts have long used to describe 
their inquiries, they also further the purpose of initiatives. In 
those respects at least, majoritarian interpretations can be un-
derstood to be legalistic, especially when today’s median re-
sembles the enacting median. So political pressures, and judg-
 151. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 153. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 75, at 196–222 (criticizing direct democ-
racy on various grounds).  
 154. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judi-
ciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696–97 (1995) (“[T]o the 
extent majoritarian pressures influence judicial decisions because of judges’ 
electoral calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least at first glance, irrec-
oncilable with one of the fundamental principles underlying constitutional-
ism.”).  
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es’ submissions to them, are not necessarily antithetical to law. 
We can understand them to promote law.  
As for the qualification, I am not the first to propose that 
courts consider the median voter when contemplating the 
meaning of legal language. Many scholars have argued that 
courts interpreting statutes do—or should—consider the pref-
erences of the median legislator or of median committee mem-
bers.155
V.  AN INTERPRETATION/REVIEW PARADOX?
 However, I am, to my knowledge, the first to make this 
argument in the context of initiatives, and in that context the 
argument has special force. Legislators passing statutes epito-
mize bargain democracy, and in bargain democracy there is no 
special reason to focus on the median. Political bargaining 
leads to statutes, or individual provisions of statutes, that favor 
one interest or another; you get your environmental protec-
tions, and I get my farm subsidies. When faced with ambigui-
ties in such provisions, courts may focus, as a default, on the 
preferences of the median legislator, but we cannot say that 
such a focus furthers the purpose of the institution or produces 
Condorcet winners. In direct democracy, on the other hand, we 
can make exactly these arguments.  
156
In addition to interpretation, legal scholars have focused 
on another aspect of direct democracy: judicial review.
   
157 How, 
they ask, should courts review the constitutionality of initia-
tives? One school of thought, championed by Professors Julian 
Eule and Derrick Bell, holds that because of their majoritarian 
character initiatives are especially likely to infringe on the 
rights of protected minorities.158 Many observers outside of the 
legal academy have expressed that same concern.159
 
 155. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 
 Eule and 
24, at 721–25. 
 156. The tradeoff identified in Part V is an instantiation of a general thesis 
I have developed in separate work. See Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independ-
ence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885104. 
 157. Of course, the two issues are linked. To determine whether an initia-
tive complies with the Constitution, judges must first determine what the ini-
tiative means. For discussion of this relationship, see generally Frickey, supra 
note 55.  
 158. See Eule, supra note 130, at 1548–58; see generally Bell, supra note 
130 (discussing instances of minority rights infringement through direct de-
mocracy). 
 159. See, e.g., Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 
41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245 (1997) (“One question persistently haunts the use 
of direct democracy: when citizens have the power to legislate issues directly, 
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Bell would mitigate it by having courts review initiatives with 
heightened scrutiny.160
Eule and Bell have their critics, but for present purposes 
suppose they are right that initiatives deserve heightened scru-
tiny. Or suppose that initiatives deserve only equivalent scruti-
ny, that is, the same level of scrutiny that laws passed through 
ordinary legislative channels receive.
  
161
Judges who are accountable to voters, as many state judges 
are, may hesitate to give initiatives the scrutiny they deserve. 
As Eule wrote, “[J]udicial protection is most needed in the face 
of voter measures motivated by popular passion or prejudice. 
Yet it is precisely when electorally accountable judges stand up 
to such efforts that they are most at risk.”
 That position is less 
controversial. Either case may give rise to a paradox. 
162 That concern is not 
entirely hypothetical. Otto Klaus, a former member of Califor-
nia’s Supreme Court, once stated that ignoring the political 
consequences of judicial decisions is “like ignoring a crocodile in 
your bathtub.”163 He admitted that his vote to uphold the con-
stitutionality of a particular initiative may have been influ-
enced by his upcoming retention election.164 More generally, 
empirical studies suggest that politics plays a role when judges 
review initiatives.165
 
will the majority tyrannize the minority?”). 
 
 160. See Bell, supra note 130, at 22–28; Eule, supra note 130, at 1548–73; 
see also Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Re-
view of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 239 (1999) (calling for 
strict scrutiny for all initiatives).  
 161. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Ju-
dicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 375–76 (1996) 
(arguing against differential standards of review for initiatives). 
 162. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initia-
tives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994) 
(footnote omitted); see also Frickey, supra note 55, at 508 (“When the same en-
tity both enacts the law and periodically elects the judges, however, judges are 
not only subject to after-the-fact discipline or replacement for their interpreta-
tions, but also are likely to be unusually deferential in the first place.”).  
 163. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52, 
58.  
 164. See Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, at 3.  
 165. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 103, at 346–50 (finding some evidence 
that judges’ political views correlate with their decisions to uphold or invali-
date initiatives when reviewing them for compliance with the single subject 
rule); John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the 
Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399, 401 (2010) (finding the same result, 
albeit without variables that control for law).  
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Given those concerns, some scholars and institutional de-
signers might like to make state judges more independent.166 
Such judges are often responsible for reviewing initiatives for 
compliance with both state and federal constitutions, and 
greater independence may be the best way to ensure that initi-
atives get the proper level of scrutiny.167
The flipside, of course, is that the relatively dependent 
state judges we have, even if they fail to deliver searching re-
view, might compensate for that shortcoming. The same de-
pendence that hinders their constitutional review might facili-
tate desirable interpretations.  
 But that change might 
have a paradoxical effect. The same independence that empow-
ers judges to review initiatives might, by breaking the electoral 
connection, reduce their incentive to resolve ambiguities in ini-
tiatives consistent with the median voter’s preference. What we 
gain in proper review we might lose, or more than lose, in in-
terpretation.  
In short, I believe that we face an important and underap-
preciated choice. We can design a judiciary that gets interpre-
tation right or that gets constitutional review right, but we 
probably cannot design a judiciary that gets both right. 
  CONCLUSION   
This paper has offered a new view of judicial interpretation 
of initiatives. It has shown that judges plausibly do—and argu-
ably should—attempt to interpret initiatives consistent with 
the preferences of the enacting median voter. Developing those 
ideas led to a variety of insights that deserve attention in their 
own right, perhaps more attention than I have given them 
here. But much of the virtue of the work may lie elsewhere. The 
main contribution may simply be clarity and concreteness. 
There is no such thing as voter intent, conventionally under-
stood, but there is such a thing as a median voter. That voter’s 
preferred interpretation has an especially strong claim to being 
the majoritarian interpretation. That set of ideas presents 
judges, for the first time, with an explicit and defensible target 
in these cases. 
 
 
 166. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 55, at 508. 
 167. Cf. id. (noting that elected judges are “politically situated far different-
ly” than federal judges when reviewing controversial ballot measures). 
